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and the regulation of
London’s Alternative
Investment Market
Philip Roscoe and Paul Willman
Abstract
The literature on financial market design is predicated on the efficient market
hypothesis (EMH), advocating transparency, liquidity and universal information
with a view to capturing efficient prices. We provide a counterfactual: the 1995
formation of AIM, the London Stock Exchange’s junior market. AIM employs
an alternative mode of market organization based on market imperfections. Our
empirical study shows how AIM draws on reputation, social relationships and
practitioner knowledge to organize market governance. We argue that the
market’s design should be understood as capable of producing informationally
efficient prices. We characterize AIM as having a ‘Whitean’ structure, compared
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with the ‘Fama’ structure of main markets. We conclude that the ‘Whitean’ pro-
ducer market is a viable design option for financial markets.
Keywords: market design; efficient market hypothesis (EMH); Fama; Harrison
White; Alternative Investment Market (AIM); market imperfections.
1. Introduction
From its inception, the science and technology studies inflected analysis of
markets – the study of ‘marketization’ (Çalısķan & Callon, 2010), the ‘new, new
economic sociology’ (McFall & Ossandón, 2014), or simply ‘market studies’
(Roscoe & Loza, 2019) – has emphasized the performative construction of dispas-
sionate, economized market relationships as a precondition for economic trans-
action, a process of ‘framing and disentangling’ (Callon, 1998) epitomized by
the transformation of the strawberry market of Fontaines-en-Sologne (Garcia-
Parpet, 2007). More recently, however, scholars have turned their attention to
the role of entanglements in organizing market transactions (Deville, 2012;
McFall et al., 2017). They see consumption and production sitting in a dialectical
relation, bound by material and affective attachments, where market designers
(and marketers) work to create new entanglements: social, technical, emotional,
legal, sentimental and practical. Within the context of finance, the theoretical
domain of the ‘social studies of finance’ (MacKenzie, 2009) scholarship has fol-
lowed a similar trajectory, emphasizing first of all the performative nature of econ-
omic thought (MacKenzie, 2006a; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003) and more recently
the role of affect and attachment in the mutual construction and qualification of
financial services, goods and valuations (Muniesa et al., 2017; Vargha, 2011).
There is an intriguing link between these theoretical positions and the practical
problem of organizing financial markets. On the one hand, we see a dominant con-
ception of how financial markets ‘should’ work, a highly performative financial
system based upon the eradication of social structures in markets (Castelle
et al., 2016; Lee, 2011).We term this organizational conception a ‘Fama’ structure
following Fama’s (1970, 1991) ‘efficient market hypothesis’. On the other, we see
the emergence of different mechanisms of organizing financial markets, following
the structures established in producer markets. We term these a ‘Whitean’ struc-
ture after White’s (1981, 2002) account of the organization of markets by reflex-
ively aware participants. Both mechanisms pursue informational efficiency as a
dominant design parameter: by informational efficiency, we mean that market
participants can rely upon available information as a reasonable approximation
of the state of investee companies, and that this is reflected in prices, an admittedly
pragmatic definition. While the former arrangement – the Fama structure and
variations – have been extensively theorized (see the contributions in Knorr
Cetina & Preda, 2012), the latter has received much less attention. The omission
is all the more striking for, as Castelle et al. (2016, p. 169) note, ‘the exchange is a
site which has aspects of both fixed-role markets – i.e. multiple exchanges may
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compete to provide trading services for brokers and dealers – and switch-role
markets: i.e. the familiar, furious “trading floor”-style buying and selling of
shares’. Exchanges exist as rivals in a Whitean market for the provision of Fama
markets. The proliferation of the ‘Fama’ model in a product market for financial
services suggests that it appeals as part of the business proposition of main board
exchanges.This begs a question:would amore ‘Fama’ exchange outcompete a less
‘Fama’ exchange, in the sense of attracting more and higher quality investors and
firms? We suggest that this may not be the case.
We illustrate our claim with an empirical analysis of the organization of the
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) the London Stock Exchange’s (LSE)
second market, founded in 1995 as a venue for higher-risk, smaller or
growing businesses. We show how attachments – social bonds, reputation and
esteem – have been fashioned into the regulatory backbone of a new genre of
financial market that flourished internationally in the first decade of the new
millennium (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2013; Mendoza, 2008; Posner, 2009). We
argue that AIM’s structure offers an effective mechanism for an informationally
efficient market. In doing so, we offer an account of the importance of imperfec-
tions in market design as generative, rather than problematic, mechanisms.
1.1. Two visions of market governance at the London Stock Exchange
The LSE’s main market, the ‘Official List’, is able to trace its history back to the
seventeenth century. Listing requirements are strict, and the LSE itself is
responsible for the quality of new arrivals and the maintenance of a fair, infor-
mationally efficient market for securities. It does this using a mixture of external
(national and trans-national) regulation and internal (private) regulation in
pursuit of a ‘Fama’ structure. In regulatory terms, an extensive framework oper-
ating under the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulatory Auth-
ority and the LSE’s own rulebook, is organized around certain key principles,
notably transparent dealing and settlement, investor protection and competitive
trading practices (Lee, 2011; Sanusi, 2018). This is underpinned by a principle
of equal access to information – at least for those who pay appropriate fees
(Davis, 2006; Sanusi, 2018). Full disclosure of trading information is mandated
by the Exchange, and is provided by proprietary technological systems (Sanusi,
2018). In theoretical terms, as Lee (2011) notes, the provision of competitive
trading, clearing and settlement services should obviate the need for regulatory
intervention in market infrastructures to promote efficiency. Fama-style organ-
ization is hardwired into the material structures of the Exchange: electronic net-
works disseminate prices instantly and on a continuous basis, while electronic
order books, a fixture of the main market since the late 1990s, automate a con-
tinuous auction among anonymous participants (Pardo-Guerra, 2019).
AIM, on the other hand, enjoys lighter listing requirements, and is governed
by a system of private regulation, with supervision delegated to Nominated
Advisors or Nomads. Finance scholars disagree as to the effectiveness of this
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structure. Hornock’s (2015) survey of the literature finds wide ranging esti-
mates of underperformance (for example 28.6 per cent to 33.5 per cent over
two years) and a strong association between capital raising and poor perform-
ance. As he notes, this is problematic for retail investors who are often only
able to buy into AIM firms at IPO; Gerakos et al. (2013) also find that unso-
phisticated retail investors are particularly exposed to poor performance.
These effects are felt even in the strongest sectors: during the property
boom from 2005 to 2015, AIM listed property stocks underperformed their
counterparts on the Official List (Newell & Marzuki, 2018).
There is alsowidespread consensus that far fewer firmsmove to themainmarket
than one might expect, particularly in view of the stated purpose of AIM as a
nursery for growing companies (Jenkinson & Ramadorai, 2013; Revest & Sapio,
2016b). Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2013) found that over the period 1996–2006
only 56 of approximately 1,600 firms made the move upwards, less than a
quarter of the number moving from the main market to AIM. In fact, traffic
flowed in the other direction: ‘upward’ movement decreased across the period
whereas ‘downward’ movement increased. Importantly, moving ‘down’ to AIM
does not lead to a long term decrease in shareholder returns, as might be expected
if poor performance was the cause of the move. Jenkinson and Ramadorai explain
this in terms of the different regulatory costs of the twomarkets as the trading tech-
nology and the framework of UK law are the same for both. They speculate that
firms may have different regulatory preferences, based on costs.
From the perspective of issue numbers and capital raised, however, AIM has
been a great success: the market has hosted a total of 3,929 companies, raising
£124 billion.1 Nielsson (2013, p. 336) proposes that high quality firms may
choose to list in less regulatedmarkets, and that a network of analysts, institutional
investors, auditors, investment banks and the media may provide an ‘alternative
bonding device’ to legal regulation. Vismara et al. (2012) highlight the ability of
companies listing on these markets to raise capital through IPO and to do so
again through secondary or ‘seasoned’ offerings; AIM has contributed to the cre-
ation of new firms, particularly in sectors where larger sums of capital have already
been raised (Revest & Sapio, 2016a). AIM ‘allows small companies to gradually
mature in a public market environment’ until they are ready to move to a full
listing (Hornock, 2015, p. 347), and provides a showroom for entrepreneurs
wishing to sell their companies (Revest & Sapio, 2016b). ‘AIM’, writes
Mendoza (2008, p. 287) succeeds because it ‘supplies a scarce product to the mar-
ketplace: rapid, low-cost access to public equity for small firms with high growth
potential’. It answers an ongoing problem where financial regulators adopt a one
size fits all strategy that imposes excessive costs onmanymarket participants (Pio-
troski, 2013, p. 216). Stringham and Chen (2012, p. 42) conclude that ‘AIM’s
system shows flexible private regulation can serve firms and investors better
than bureaucratic government regulation… Private regulators have an entirely
different set of knowledge and incentives from those of government bureaucrats’.
These more positive accounts anticipate the claims of our sociological per-
spective. As informational efficiency emerges as the dominant design principle
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for financial markets, we show how the market’s structure draws on social
relationships and practitioner knowledge to achieve this. Design choices were
shaped by existing market relationships and practices as well as the institution’s
strategic commitments and organizational path dependencies. In practical
terms, the market’s regulation would seem fit-for-purpose; in theoretical
terms, we suggest AIM’s ‘Whitean’ structure provides a counterfactual to
the Fama market found on main-board exchanges.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we examine the
link between economic theory and the design of financial markets, with particu-
lar reference to market ‘efficiency’. We then turn in Section 3 to the analysis of
social structure within financial markets and the relationship between social
structure and informational efficiency. Section 4 outlines methods. Section 5
presents the empirical data on the AIM market. Section 6 discusses, while
section 7 offers concluding thoughts on implications and wider issues.
2. Economic theory and financial markets
When Ronald Coase (1988) described financial markets as examples of perfect
competition he was describing the views of the economics profession, rather
than the practice of markets. Paradoxically, as Coase also points out, the con-
ditions of a perfect market require an authority structure to secure the
market ‘involving an intricate system of rules and regulations’ to prevent mal-
feasance (Coase, 1988, p. 9). As many researchers in the sociology of finance
tradition have noted, financial markets are deliberately designed structures
(e.g. MacKenzie, 2009); the additional insight available from the Coase
approach is that, once designed, these ‘market wrapped in a hierarchy’
devices must be regulated and maintained in order to avoid the emergence of
market imperfections.
Since Coase (1988) wrote, the number of financial exchanges has expanded
substantially. There has been a growth in geographical coverage (Weber et al.,
2009), and in specialization (for example, carbon futures exchanges). The vast
majority of exchanges are firms, either publicly quoted – for example the
London Stock Exchange is a firm whose stock is traded on the London main
market – or privately owned (MacKenzie, 2017). It is now possible to speak
of an exchange ‘industry’ in which competition, collaboration and mergers
occur, a position underscored by the European ‘MiFID’ regulation, with its
intention to create a market in markets (Lenglet & Mol, 2016). Empirically,
Coase’s ‘market in a hierarchy’ description has been robust at an industry level.
Exchanges exist to bring together investors in and sellers of securities – for
example firms in equity markets and governments in bond markets. They do so
by building platforms that minimize the transaction costs of trades, maximize
trading completion speeds and generate pools of liquidity so that trading can be
continuous. There are huge network effects and exchanges seek to maximize
order flow. Competition between exchanges may be on cost and speed, but
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also by differentiation, perhaps by specialization on specific securities, or by
ease of listing. Revenues consist of fees for transactions clearing and settlement,
membership fees for firms to be listed and, most importantly, charges for quote
and price information (Lee, 1998). However, such information is not costless to
produce, so the business models of financial market exchanges require that
access to price information be restricted to a set of identified actors (Lee,
1998, pp. 46–67). There arises, therefore, a necessary tension between the com-
mercial concerns of financial exchanges and the principles of perfect market
organization on which they are based, namely anonymity, continuous auctions,
homogeneous and standardized commodities, liquidity and effective enforce-
ment (Garcia-Parpet, 2007). For financial markets, the core issue is price infor-
mation, and the key theorists are Walras and Fama.
Walras provides the theoretical account underpinning notions ‘informational
efficiency’ in markets. He proposed the existence of a notional auctioneer in a
market who conducts continuous auctions around the price of commodities,
adjusting the price to supply and demand (see Lee, 1998, pp. 216–217).
Under Walrasian assumptions, there exists a unique market clearing price for
each commodity and the price contains all relevant information such that
agents in the market do not need to engage in costly search about either the
underlying value of the commodity or the actions of other market participants.
This Walrasian approach has been adapted by Fama (1970, 1991) to financial
markets in the ‘efficient markets hypothesis’ (EMH). For Fama, a market is
efficient where prices fully and instantaneously reflect all available relevant
information about a security.2 With such informational efficiency, prices thus
become the key signals in capital allocation decisions so that informational effi-
ciency yields allocative efficiency. Individual agents trade to maximize profits
so, for example, if they have private positive information about a security,
they will buy it and the private information becomes public by showing up
in the price. Given that the current price should be the best estimate of the
future price, prices in an efficient market should follow a random walk as
unpredictable new information – a hot summer, perhaps, or a pandemic – influ-
ences prices. As Lee puts it:
Fama’s notion of efficient markets has come to underpin much regulation con-
cerning the dissemination of price and quote information in financial markets
… . Without the publication of prices and quotes…market participants will
not have sufficient information to be adequately informed, that the prices of
assets traded in the market will therefore not be informationally efficient and
that allocative efficiency will therefore not obtain. (1998, p. 222)
From this understanding, paired with an underlying assumption of atomistic,
profit maximizing, non-colluding individual market participants, emerge
design parameters for an exchange requiring that all agents in the market
have the information necessary to trade both costlessly and immediately.
These non-colluding market participants cannot be taken for granted, and
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market design also mandates perfect competition, such that multiple sellers
cannot fix prices. This dominant understanding of the ‘perfect market’ is
highly performative and has been played out in the social and technological
transformations of ‘main board’ exchanges since the 1980s (Castelle et al.,
2016); the regulatory and technological organization of the LSE’s Official
List has been shaped accordingly (Pardo-Guerra, 2019; Sanusi, 2018) since
London’s own ‘Big Bang’ of 1986 (Clemons & Weber, 1990).
3. Social structure and efficiency
Themost general points tomake about the economic approach to financial markets
are as follows. TheCoaseian idea of a financial market as a perfect ‘market wrapped
in a hierarchy’ rests on the strong assumption that the two forms of social structure
can be kept separate. As Lee notes above, the hypothesis has been extremely influ-
ential in its impact on the design and regulation of exchanges. The interplay of
social structure and regulatory form may here be characterized by the Granovet-
terian position, where markets are constructed as efficient and social structures
emerge within them as mechanisms to protect individual market agents from
downside risk or unexpected volatility. If social structures emerge in efficient
markets they are likely to act in favour of market participants and against
broader welfare issues (cf. Lee, 2011). Such structures will be diagnosed as imper-
fections to be regulated away. This logic characterizes Fama designed markets,
including the LSE main market – indeed, Davis’s (2006, p. 7) empirical study
of price formation on the LSE shows exactly this tension, where ‘market regu-
lations and metrological practices are as likely to develop as a response to actor-
driven “cycles of opportunism and restraint” (Abolafia, 1996)’. It implies the
primacy of external market regulation as a control mechanism.
Yet the EMH, if taken seriously, presents market operators with an intract-
able problem. It depends upon the existence of arbitrage, where mis-pricing can
be traded away without risk. This could, for example, be a miscalculation of
value or an arbitrage based on geographical and temporal difference, the
favoured strategy of high-frequency traders. As Zuckerman (2012) argues,
this arbitrage is both central to the generation of informational efficiency and
yet, by Fama’s own reasoning, highly unlikely. For if prices were information-
ally efficient, arbitrage would have very low returns to the arbitrageur, and it
would be irrational to engage in it. If no market actor participates in arbitrageur
activities, however, prices do not reflect value: ‘… if all investors believe in the
EMH, the market cannot be efficient’ (Zuckerman, 2012, p. 230, original empha-
sis). Market efficiency degrades into a collective action problem where, put col-
loquially, some of the people need to believe in efficient markets all of the time
or all of the people some of the time, but not all of the people all of the time.
Empirically, Willman et al. (2001) and Roscoe (2015) reach similar conclusions,
arguing that traders in markets hold contradictory beliefs: that the EMH
broadly works but that they can also beat the market. This overconfident
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trading on inadequate private information is noise, and efficient markets
depend upon it (Black, 1986; Preda, 2017).
In practice, most financial markets solve the arbitrage problem through
mechanisms of social structure: by defining a role of ‘market maker’ who per-
forms the arbitrage role of buying when there is excess supply and selling when
there is excess demand, transacting against the market. Willman et al. (2006,
p. 1362) point out that sociological research has been successful in theorizing
the issue, with explanations centring on the interrelated processes of learning,
information search, reciprocity and network building. The most substantial
account of these roles is that of Abolafia (1996), but his study resonates with
other findings about the working of exchanges in the sociology of finance litera-
ture on both open outcry and electronic markets (see for example the collection
on pp. 115–223 in Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2012): there appear to be formal and
informal controls, conventions and norms and values other than self-interest in
most financial markets.
Exchanges themselves have a dual social structure, serving two distinct pur-
poses: as a locus of financial transactions (markets) and as a provider of
exchange services (firms). As exchange ‘producers’ they provide a switch-role
Fama market to buyers and sellers of securities, and occupy a fixed-role produ-
cer market (Aspers, 2007; Castelle et al., 2016) where the market’s basic organ-
ization stems from the producers’mutual and reflexive awareness of themselves
and their rivals. This latter was theorized by Harrison White, for whom
‘knowing oneself, and being known, to be in a given market is the single
most important aspect of getting established in business’ (White, 2002,
p. 121). For White, social structures emerge or are designed to provide a frame-
work for specific sets of transactions between market participants. They help to
organize the market per se, rather than subvert its operation; they provide econ-
omic benefits to market participants only to the extent that they do not jeopar-
dize or undermine the social structure that constitutes the market.
To recap, economic theory of financial markets positions informational effi-
ciency as the dominant design parameter for financial markets. The problem of
noise, as theorized by sociological studies, makes clear that the structure that
Fama suggests generates such efficiency – irrational arbitrage in an atomistic
market – is neither logically or empirically possible in its pure form. Social
structure becomes essential in the maintenance of market function. We may
thus examine elements of social structure in terms of whether they facilitate,
impede or are neutral with respect to informational efficiency, and more gen-
erally, the commercial positioning of exchanges as firms, specifically whether
a more ‘Fama’ exchange might outcompete a less ‘Fama’ exchange.
4. Methodology
Data were collected as part of a larger project that sought to document, from a
sociological perspective, the interconnected history of two stock-markets
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founded in London in the mid-1990s. One, AIM, is the subject of this paper.
The other, OFEX (latterly PLUS), effectively ceased trading at the time of the
financial crisis. Both emerged from the same milieu of regulatory and techno-
logical changes, as a result of the same strategic moves by the London Stock
Exchange, and through the same social networks. Over a period of 18
months, from 2016 to 2017, the first author conducted 54 interviews with
almost all of the major participants in the new markets (39 participants, total-
ling 73 hours). Many interviews were conducted on a named basis appropriate
to the historical nature of the project. Interviewees are listed in Appendix.
Interviews followed the pattern of career/life history (Yow, 2005), asking inter-
viewees to recollect their entire careers in the financial sector (often from early
apprenticeships on the floor of the old London Stock Exchange from which
rich social networks arose). Interview data were supplemented by personal
communications and informal conversations as well as textual sources, amount-
ing to over 1,000 pages and included newspaper articles, company documents,
prospectuses and annual reports, newsletters and lobbying materials, regulatory
disclosures, press releases and marketing materials. Data were compiled into a
narrative account of the formation of AIM. We also use previous published and
unpublished work on the operation of the AIMmarket (Yu, 2010). Our data did
not show interviewees discussing the merits of Fama versus Whitean markets;
these are theoretical categories we have imposed on the analysis. Interviewees
discussed emotive and effective notions such as trust, reputation, ‘good compa-
nies’ and ‘reliable management’, and relationships built up over decades.
Equally, the administration of main board markets is couched in terms of effi-
ciency, transparency and investor protection (cf. Lee, 2011).
5. Analysis: A market built from networks
Our premise is that exchanges must design some kind of governance mechan-
isms into their organizational structure to avoid malfeasance and promote infor-
mational efficiency, and that their choice of mechanism may be governed by the
logics of competitive positioning within a market for exchange services. We
focus on AIM as a market that has implemented – successfully – a distinctive
kind of governance based on social ties. In this, we suggest, it has a Whitean
structure rather than the idealized ‘Fama’ structure.
The stated intention of a junior market is to offer listing facilities to younger
and smaller companies that could subsequently list on ‘main board’ exchanges.
Despite increasing competition among global exchanges, AIM’s champions
argue that it has established itself as the world’s leading stock market for com-
panies with high growth potential (Arcot et al., 2007; Hornock, 2015). Figures 1
and 2 show admissions and fundraising data from inception (1995) to the
present. They make clear how AIM succeeded in both areas, particularly in
the period from the end of the first dot-com boom in 2001 until 2008. The
market is now smaller than in 2008, but fundraising activity remains strong.
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In 2018, approximately 950 companies were listed, with an average market
capitalization of approximately £100 million; by 2021 the concentration of
capital had increased, and 822 companies were listed with an aggregate value
of £145bn.
AIM has also drawn international attention as an exemplar of market struc-
ture. Following the collapse of the dot-com bubble the AIM model gained
popularity as growth-company exchanges spread across Europe and beyond
(Mendoza, 2008; Posner, 2009). It has been replicated in Italy (AIM Italia)
and Japan (Tokyo AIM) (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2013).
Figure 1 Admission and fundraising activity on the AIM market
Source: LSE.
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As our review of the sociological literature made clear, the building of a ‘Fama’
market requires a sustained effort in removing social ties. AIM, on the other
hand, made no such endeavour: it was built from social relationships from the
outset. It was launched at a difficult moment in the Exchange’s history as the
financial community pressured the LSE to rethink its closure of an earlier
junior market, the Used Serviceable Material (USM) market. The Exchange’s
management sought to placate the community, to position theLSE as a supporter
of the nation’s entrepreneurial dynamism, especially in view of dissatisfaction
with the role of banks and venture capital houses in funding small firms, and
in doing so to make use of networks of regional stockbrokers and exchange
members left behind after the closure of the UK’s regional bourses in 1973. It
sought also to open the pockets of wealthy investors in Scotland, Northern
Ireland and the English regions by offering them a chance to invest in firms
based in those regions. Theresa Wallis, the executive placed in charge of devel-
oping the market, recalls how the logic of social ties extended to investment in
risky ‘growth firms’:
One of the things I heard and learnt when I first came on with the role was…
investors, when it comes to small companies, they’d rather invest close to home
where they can go and visit the companies and they look them in the eye and all
that sort of thing. (Wallis)
Wallis and her team set up a lengthy consultation with exchange members,
issuers, corporate advisors and legal firms, touring the country ‘even up to
Inverness’, and talked the market into being (Palo et al., 2018) through the
Figure 2 Key participants in the Alternative Investment Market
Source: Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998).
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‘continuous iterative process’ of a consultation that was ‘very diligent and quite
pedantic’ (Hughes). The market was designed and constructed through conver-
sations within the community:
You’d be invited round for dinner at Clifford Chance [a legal firm], or some-
thing. It was all about the market, getting to understand it, and that engagement.
You could tell that the relationship was very close. You could tell that it was
understood why it was important… there was never anyone who was not
willing to engage properly. (Hughes)
The market clearly positioned itself against the LSE’s Official List in terms of
its listing requirements (these are shown in Table 1). It filled the space vacated
by the USM, designed as a mechanism for younger, smaller, entrepreneurial
firms, offering a listing venue for newly formed companies with lower capita-
lization and free float requirements; as Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2013, p. 860)
note, ‘it is literally possible to create a new company and have it trading on AIM
within two to three weeks’. A variety of regulatory innovations made this poss-
ible. AIM was classified as an ‘exchange-regulated market’ run by the LSE.
The nature of an exchange-regulated market allows AIM to waive most of
the mandatory provisions contained in European Union Directives as appli-
cable to public listings in the United Kingdom, and permits it a form of self-
regulation, which is pivotal to the rise of AIM’s model. An AIM admission
does not fall under any regulatory body. There are no specific requirements
Table 1 Listing requirements and obligations, LSE main market and AIM compared
Main market AIM
Admissions requirements
Minimum 25 per cent shares in public hands No minimum public float
Three year trading record No trading record required
Pre-vetting of admission documents by recognized
authority
No pre-vetting of documents
Admission takes several months Admission can be achieved
within two weeks
Minimum capitalization on entry No minimum capitalization
Sliding scale admission fees up to £142,000 Flat rate admission fee, £4,000
Continuing obligations
Prior shareholder approval required for substantial
acquisitions and disposals
No approval required
Companies subject to extensive continuing
obligations by UK Listing Authority
Sliding scale annual fees up to £20,000 Flat rate annual fee: £4,000
Other costs and benefits
Fees for subsequent issues No charge for subsequent issues
Beneficial tax regime for
company owners
Source: Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2013).
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regarding minimum company size, track record, number of shares in public
hands, or earnings. After admission, the ongoing obligations with which
firms must comply are kept at a minimum. AIM companies, for example, do
not need to obtain shareholder approval for transactions other than reverse
takeovers or fundamental disposals (disposals of more than 75 per cent of
assets).
Yet, as we have argued above, a market needs a mechanism to avoid malfea-
sance and to ensure some kind of informational efficiency. Such light touch
requirements were only possible due to the dense social networks and interper-
sonal-knowledge within London’s financial community, which the market’s
designers co-opted into a new species of private regulator: the Nomad.
5.1. Nomad-based regulation
The disclosure and corporate governance provisions for AIM companies follow
the UK tradition of principles-based regulation.3 The consultation had initially
hoped to avoid the expensive requirement of sponsorship (a corporate advisory
firm responsible for vetting the applications to list on the market) and the
associated administrative burden on the LSE’s own supervisory offices.
According to Simon Brickles, one of Wallis’ team who subsequently became
Head of AIM, a stock exchange ‘should be the high temple of capitalism, we
should allow as much choice and freedom as compatible with a reasonable
level of investor protection’. The consultation settled on a ‘disclosure-based’
based structure reliant upon the principle of caveat emptor, focusing regulatory
efforts around ensuring full disclosure of financial information and assuming
that investors have sufficient sophistication to act accordingly. Nonetheless,
those involved in the consultation argued that some kind of oversight would
be necessary involving quality control outsourced to a network of professional
advisers in a structure of private regulation. Figure 2 illustrates the key partici-
pants in AIM.
At the forefront of this network are the Nomads, the corporate finance
firms bringing issues to market. Listed companies are required to retain a
Nomad, and if they are unable to do so will be forced to leave the market.
Nomads have an ongoing responsibility to their client firms to provide
advice, mandate adequate disclosure and oversee compliance with regulation.
Nomads themselves are policed by reputation and a concern for repeat
business among clients and investors. AIM is a ‘reputational market’
(Mendoza, 2008, p. 333) where social relations become the structure under-
lying informational efficiency. Offenders will be disciplined by public
exposure. This is epitomized by the Telegraph’s conclusion to the story of
one market misdemeanour: ‘a good public flogging serve[s] to remind
brokerage houses to show a little caution in who they bring to market in
the first place – and the importance of never, ever misleading investors’
(quoted by Stringham & Chen, 2012, p. 42).
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The AIM rules legislate for social and reputational entanglements. The
Nomad must be independent of the issuer, must be a firm that has practiced
corporate finance for at least the previous two years, has acted on at least
three relevant transactions during that period, and has employed at least four
qualified executives. Qualified executives are full-time employees who have
acted in a corporate finance advisory role for at least three years and who
have acted as the lead on at least three appropriate capital market transactions
in the previous three years. Tim Ward, responsible for drafting the initial spe-
cification of the governance role, explains:
The Exchange did not want firms which did not have a reputation to suddenly pop
on this market and build their reputation on the back of the market. It was necessary
for the firms that were Nominated Advisors to have a reputation that they needed to
protect and enhance, rather than one to create. So it was not one for new boys to
come in saying we are going to build our business off the back of this…
Nomads simultaneously play roles as AIM advisors, gatekeepers and regulators.
For this reason, some argue that due diligence is at least as burdensome as it is
on the main market and more so than in the United States.4 Nomad supervision
is concentrated, with a small number of firms supervising a large proportion of
listed firms. This concentrates reputational capital further: such Nomads tend
to be specialized and have high sunk costs in AIM. Nomads’ interests are
aligned with those of investors by the necessity of future business, dealing
with a small number of institutional investors: ‘if a firm was to repeatedly
bring poor quality companies to the market then they would very quickly
find that they could not go back to the institutional investors’ (Stuttard). By
one investor’s wistful analogy, ‘AIM is like an exotic garden, which provides
the soil, the light and temperature. Companies are young plants with different
genes. The Nomad is the gardener, selecting the seeds, fostering their growth,
and maintaining the garden’.5 Such selection and tending is based on dense
market ties and knowledge:
When it came to AIM, there was a network underneath which says, that
company, don’t touch it. And so an awful lot of this stuff was unwritten, unrec-
orded, but by and large, one of the reasons why AIM survived better than most
was because we did things like that. Can’t discuss it publicly, deny all knowl-
edge. (Vardey)
And,
[x] and [x] had a ‘cerebral database’. [x] would phone [x] and ask do you know
about so-and-so and would get a yes, no, don’t touch with a bargepole answer.
But you couldn’t write any of it down so they called it a cerebral database.
(Hocken)
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Nomads are liable for improper reporting by their supervised companies, such
as misstatements or omissions in an admission document, and subject to law-
suits if investors are misled. The Exchange periodically issues fines in cases
where Nomads fail to discharge their responsibilities properly. But these
remain rare.6 Censure and reputational damage remain the most powerful
levers available to the Exchange, operating the ‘tools and instruments of a
club’:
the black-balling and… the censure was the thing, a private censure… [and] the
public censure, which was really only ever used when you were trying to give a
signal that somebody was a wrong ‘un. (Brickles)
5.2. Investor-based regulation
Although the Nomads carry legal responsibility for supervision, the tight
network of institutional investors that operates in the market also assists in
information flow. AIM has developed a strong track record in raising money
for growing businesses. Roughly 60 per cent of this capital has been raised
through secondary, or follow-on issues. AIM has attracted a particularly
well-developed base of institutional investors, including Fidelity, Goldman
Sachs and UBS, which lead a deep and highly sophisticated pool of institutional
capital dedicated to small and mid-cap shares. The market is dominated by
institutional investors to a much greater extent than, for example, NASDAQ
in the United States (Arcot et al., 2007). Unlike retail investors that trade
more frequently for short-term benefits, institutional investors are potentially
stable, long-term holders of these shares. Furthermore, with relatively few
retail shareholders, most IPOs and secondary offerings on AIM take the
form of placings with institutions. A significant number of AIM-listed compa-
nies seek to raise additional capital from their existing shareholder base over
time and so managers and advisors must act in the expectation that they will
return to the same buyer in due course.
The day-to-day work of investors involves meeting with and building
relationships with the managers of potential and actual investee firms, who
in turn maintain tight links with a small number of investors. One specialist
fund manager comments:
I probably see them [investee management] once every six months. But I’ve
known them… I must have known them pretty much for, well 25 years. The
chief exec’s been there probably for 15… . People ring me up and say, I’ve
got a really interesting company I’d love you to see, and I say fine, here’s a
spot in the diary. (Williams)
The lack of retail investors means that institutional investors wield a great deal
of influence in these book-building negotiations, as another fund manager
makes clear:
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They [brokers] come and see you and they do a presentation… and they say, we
want 10p and you say, maybe five, eight, two? I’ve been spoken to by brokers and
financial advisers to companies many a time saying, well, if we make it 7p would
you do half a million quid or something to which the answer is, no, it’s going to
be 5p or nothing and I’ll do a million quid at 5p or, you know… I’m not going to
pay the wrong price as I see it for a smaller sum of money. It’s right or wrong.
The sum of money is irrelevant. It’s right or wrong. (Buchanan)
As well as a Nomad, issuer firms need to maintain a broker, whose job it is to
maintain an orderly market in the stock. Again, this involves building compre-
hensive relationships with institutional investors, working to develop an
ongoing demand for the stock so that, should a large shareholder choose to
liquidate a holding, the market remains unscathed:
The market price, the price you see on the screen, is generally set by the retail
investor, the balance of buyers and sellers, all these five grands and 10 grands
and 20 grands worth of stock.… so they will interact with our market makers,
which will adjust the price depending on the supply and demand in the
market. The institutional investors generally stay out of that. They don’t deal
in small amounts. But if they want to sell a million pounds worth of stock…
I can ring up another institutional investor, and if he agrees to buy it at that
price, we match them. So the million pounds worth of stock goes through the
market, one’s sold, one’s bought. But it doesn’t change the market price.
Someone can come on and buy £10,000 worth and it will put it up, or if they
buy or sell, it could put it up or down by five to ten per cent. (Norcross)
This mechanism of direct transfer closely resembles an increasingly common
form of transaction that seeks to circumvent the price formation mechanisms
of main board markets, the deals between investment banks carried out in
‘dark pools’ or over electronic networks: large transactions made at the mid-
price so as not to disrupt the market (Lagna & Lenglet, 2019; MacKenzie,
2019). It also resembles the organization of markets in art or collectibles,
where high profile auctions serve to set and maintain the valuation of artworks
in the public sphere, while much trade is done between brokers in private
(Coslor, 2016). These ongoing trades can only be made possible by the constant
work of the Nomad in maintaining positive relationships and good information
flow between investors and firms.
6. Discussion: Fama and White markets
For Coase, the ‘market within a hierarchy’ constitutes a ‘private legal system’
and
enforcement of the rules is possible because the opportunity to trade on the
exchange is of great value and the withholding of permission to trade is a
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sanction sufficiently severe to induce most traders to observe the rules of the
exchange. (1988, p. 10)
Our argument is that there may be more than one set of rules of private law that
fulfil this necessary condition. Informational efficiency becomes the dominant
design principle of the exchange, and exchanges must design some kind of gov-
ernance mechanisms into their organizational structure to achieve this. As
private law may differ, so their choice of mechanism may be governed by the
logics of positioning within a market for exchange services. For the most
part, as we have seen, exchanges have sought to implement ‘Fama’ market
structures, where social structure is seen as an impediment to market function,
the Granovetterian position (Preda, 2009); this logic characterizes the LSE
main market, and implies the primacy of external market regulation as a
control mechanism.
We do not claim here that the LSE’s main board is Fama efficient. We have
drawn attention to the empirical improbability of the Fama structure, a situation
likely to result in practice in the hybrid described by Abolafia (1996), where reg-
ulators and market practitioners conduct an ongoing dialogue between external
regulation and the internally generated rules and conventions of the market.
Empirical research has indeed shown that the LSE falls some way short of
the Fama ideal, with investment activity embedded in dense social networks
within a community dominated by a small number of large institutions
(Davis, 2006). This picture has been complicated in the last decade by the
expansion of automated high-frequency trading (HFT), to the point where
the vast majority of equity trading (over 90 per cent globally and by extension
on the LSE) is conducted by algorithms (Hayes, 2019). HFT strips out social
relations and brings additional complexities of black boxing, organizational
ignorance and epistemic difference into play (see Coombs, 2016; Lange, 2016;
Lenglet & Mol, 2016; Seyfert, 2016, and other contributions to issue 45 of
this journal). Centralized exchange systems can be circumvented by anonymous
‘dark pools’ (Lagna & Lenglet, 2019).
Our point here is that the design of the LSE’s main market, understood both
in terms of regulation and this socio-technical structures, is driven by and
adheres to Fama principles, an observation borne out by Davis’ (2006)
finding that social relationships and regulation are antagonistic in the LSE.
Where social networks and norms emerge in such a market, they are to be
viewed with suspicion as market imperfections and eradicated. This is the
Granovetterian position: social networks emerging to benefit existing market
agents. It is beyond the scope of this study to document the extent to which
these mechanisms have been successful in removing social networks from the
operation of the LSE’s main board. We draw a comparison between the organ-
izational intention of the main board – the pursuit of efficiency through the
removal of social content, an ‘abstract transparency’ invoking the neoclassical
ideal of the mechanical auctioneer (see Grossman et al., 2006) – and a
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regulatory intention in AIM that deliberately invokes social relationships as a
means of pursuing informational efficiency.
A second part of our argument is, therefore, that the balance between
external regulation and internal self-regulation is an important design
choice and source of variation in systems of private law for financial
markets. We have shown how AIM established a system of internal private
regulation based on pre-existing social structures (an ‘equity culture’) and
how that system is designed to facilitate information flow in an otherwise
informationally opaque and often illiquid market. Evidence of stable net-
works, and thus counterparty identity, are central to AIM. We have shown
that social structures were designed into AIM from its very outset, and
that its distinctive regulatory identity depends upon relations of interpersonal
knowledge, obligation, reputation and other affectual bonds between partici-
pants. AIM has been successful in terms of attracting firms and investors; its
structure is informationally efficient because AIM is an example of a
‘Whitean’ producer market.
For White, producer markets are characterized as stable networks of
mutually aware actors sending reputationally weighted signals of quality and
volume within identifiable market boundaries. Producers
come to treat each other and to be treated by the outside world as structurally
equivalent through the evolution of input and output networks of ties… .
Knowing oneself, and being known, to be in a given market is the
single most important aspect of getting established in business. (White,
2002, p. 121)
The core ‘producers’ on AIM are Nomads. White argues (2002, pp. 177–199)
that producer markets have ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ elements.
‘Upstream’ in AIM is the supply of shares from listed companies and ‘down-
stream’ is investor demand for such shares. In a producer market, actors
relate to other producers, not simply to their products, since contracts
tend to be relational rather than transactional. In AIM, investors tend to
rely on the Nomad’s reputation, rather than a painstaking analysis of the fun-
damentals of the Nomad’s specific firms; our data show how investors build
long-term relationships with Nomads and brokers, both of which are gov-
erned by the threat of exclusion from the market in the case of malfeasance.
This ‘Coasean’ sanction has been achieved in a manner quite different from
the Fama structure, through an internally generated rather than externally
imposed form of regulation. At this point, we can return to our initial, some-
what pragmatic, definition of informational efficiency. We suggest that prices
negotiated by crowds of reflexively aware producers (Nomads and insti-
tutional investors) are efficient inasmuch as they capture the sum of available
information in a market that often lacks liquidity and depth. The Nomad
signals listed firm quality and price to investors such that the latter needs
no further search to establish a price that is an accurate signal of future
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revenue. Where a Fama market seeks to dissolve social bonds, AIM’s govern-
ance creates and rearranges social, affectual and practical links between
reflexively aware producers of investment information.
7. Concluding remarks
What does this mean for the design of markets and the accompanying sociology
of heterogeneous market types (Frankel et al., 2019)?
Despite the prevalence of the Fama market as a business offering among
main board exchanges, we suggest that there may be alternative social structural
options to achieve a given level of informational efficiency, and that that
alternative structures may, in fact, be just as successful as the established
‘Fama’ market. Expectations that AIM would function as a feeder for the
main market (Hornock, 2015) have been disappointed, for AIM seems to
have been successful on its own terms. The transaction costs of switching
from AIM to the Official List are high and these costs include loss of social
capital. AIM remains a tight network, comprising specialized investors and
advisory firms skilled in smaller company work. AIM is viable both as a com-
mercial proposition in a Whitean market for exchange services and as an infor-
mationally efficient Whitean market for investors and firms.
It remains only to look to the future and to challenges that might confront the
Whitean model. In emphasizing that financial markets can be understood as
systems of emergent social dynamics rather than organized performances of
economic theory, we do not suggest that Whitean markets are any less in
need of maintenance. On the contrary, the social relations that underpin
AIM must be constantly replenished through the socialization of new advisors
into the norms of the community. It cannot be expected that this will take place
without supervision and it remains the responsibility of the Exchange to
reinforce these norms: ‘It was always implicit…we would shoot one
[Nomad] a year pour encourager les autres’ (Vardey). Several interviewees felt
that an emphasis on AIM’s growth had caused the LSE to stay such executions
unnecessarily. More significantly, in AIM’s first decades the entanglements of
the community flowed from relationships forged on the floor of a pre-digital
exchange. By 2021 there are few who remember that era, and a pre-existing
tapestry of social relations can no longer be taken for granted. The extent to
which AIM remains a ‘club’ and can be supervised like one is, therefore,
open for debate.
It may also be that such Whitean systems reproduce and gloss forms of
social closure, and this is worthy of future research. The regulatory emphasis
on qualified individuals appears to preclude new entrants, and those not
attuned to the habitus of the community may be disbarred. Advisory firms
complain that the same rules precipitate conflict between the qualified execu-
tives and the firms. If a firm loses its fourth executive it loses its licence to
operate, and it is easy for four executives to cooperate in bidding up salaries.
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As Callon (1998) and those following have noticed, markets ‘overflow’ with
unexpected consequences, some of which may permanently disrupt market
operation.
Overall, however, we conclude that a producer market is a viable design
option for a financial exchange. This claim is of increasing relevance in an
era where market design is dominated by concerns over the fragility of
markets dominated by HFT. Academics and regulators have recognized the
dangers of excessive interpersonal efficiency (Aldridge & Krawciw, 2017;
Beunza et al., 2012). The homogeneity and interconnectedness of global
main board exchanges might usefully be tempered by alternative mechanisms
of market governance. In a producer market, ties of reputation, practitioner
knowledge and sociality – market imperfections – underpin the effective func-
tioning of the market. As economists seek to tackle social problems using
markets as ‘boutique information processors’ (Nik-Khah & Mirowski, 2019)
and activists search for new models of market arrangement and participation
(Callon, 2017; Geiger & Gross, 2018), we emphasize the importance of these
entanglements, not only to those engaged in market design, but also to scholars
commenting thereon.
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Notes
1 https://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/markets/aim/aim.htm
(accessed 7 May 2021).
2 There is a difference between earlier and later versions of the hypothesis
around the meaning of both ‘relevant’ and ‘available’. See Fenton-O’Creevy et al.
(2005).
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3 A principles-based approach relies upon principles and outcome-focused rules
rather than detailed rules prescribing how outcomes must be achieved (‘Principles-
based regulation’, FSA, April 2007).
4 Speech by Tom Troubridge from PWC, at the Corporate Governance Research
Seminar on AIM at the London School of Economics on 12 March 2008.
5 Speech by David Pinniger from Abingworth Life Sciences and Healthcare Invest-
ment in a seminar on AIM at LSE on 12 March 2008.
6 On 8 August 2005, the LSE issued its first public rebuke of a Nomad, Durlacher
Corporation (a former investment banking company which has since merged with
Panmure Gordon & Co.), for delaying a profits warning by its AIM-listed client Pre-
stbury Holdings for eight days while the company carried out fundraising. In addition,
there were a number of private censures of AIM companies and Nomads for breaches of
the AIM Rules. (Source: Stock exchange AIM disciplinary notices and news, for
example, MacDonald, 2007).
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Andrew Beeson Founder Beeson Gregory, broker, Chairman of Schroders
Andrew Buchanan Fund manager
Barry Hocken OFEX executive, Newstrack founder, small company
financier
Brian Winterflood* Founder, Winterflood Securities, market-maker
Corporate advisor 1* Small company financier
Corporate advisor 2* Small company financier
Corporate advisor 4* Small company financier
Corporate advisor 5 Small company financier
Emma Jenkins Former MD of OFEX, daughter of John Jenkins
Fund manager 1 Fund manager
Geoff Hoodless* Founder Hoodless Brennan, broker
Gervais Williams Fund manager
Giles Vardey* LSE Director of Market Development, Chairman of PLUS
John Jenkins Founder, JP Jenkins, founder OFEX, former chairman of
OFEX
Jonathan Jenkins* Former MD of OFEX, son of John Jenkins
John French Company promoter
Marcus Stuttard* Current Head of AIM and UK Primary Markets at the LSE
Market executive 1* Market executive
Market executive 2 Market executive
Market executive 3 Market executive
(Continued )
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Name/Pseudonym Role
Market executive 4 Market executive
Market executive 5 Market executive
Market executive 6* Market executive
Market maker 1 Market-maker
Market maker 2 Market-maker
Martin Hughes Seconded to AIM launch team
Paul Brown Cofounder JP Jenkins Ltd
Phil Nathan Director of broking, Charles Stanley
Promoter 2 Company promoter
Public relations 1 Former journalist, Public relations
Public relations 2 Public relations
Public relations 3 Public relations
Public relations 4 Former journalist, Public relations
Simon Brickles Former Head of AIM, former CEO of OFEX
Stephen Hazell-
Smith*
Fund manager, former Chairman of PLUS
Stephen Norcross* Director of broking, Finncap
Theresa Wallis* Former Head of AIM
Tim Ward* Former member of AIM launch team, CEO of QCA
* denotes multiple interviews. Interviews were conducted on the record unless requested
otherwise. Anonymity, where requested, required the anonymizing of groups e.g. ‘market
executive’.
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